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ARGUMENT
Defendants admit that they took Mr. Briggs' money and never delivered the goods,
and this fact has forced Briggs to litigate just to get his money back. In their Brief of
Appellees ("Opp'n Br."), Defendants have misrepresented the applicable law and Mr.
Briggs' legal arguments. Defendants have further taken unwarranted liberties with the
facts in evidence and the record, including such whoppers as "Mr. Briggs knew that his
$70,000 damages claim was meritless." (Opp'n Br. at 34) Needless to say, Mr. Briggs has
consistently denied ever knowing that his claim was meritless and Defendants have
admitted his claim had at least $8,939.19 worth of merit (Opp'n Br. at 30). In addition,
Defendants admit that there are material facts in dispute. Finally, Defendants rely
(perhaps unintentionally) on case law that supports Mr. Briggs' position that summary
judgment was improperly granted.1
Rebutting every falsehood, mischaracterization, and errant legal citation in
Defendants' brief would be needlessly burdensome for both Mr. Briggs and this Court, so
this Reply Brief addresses the errors and admissions that directly affect the summary
judgments at issue in this appeal.

I. INTRODUCTION
Despite a raft of disputed facts, the Third District Court granted two summary
1 See below for our discussion regarding Defendants' reasonable time inference,
construction against the drafter, and materiality arguments - each of which raises
4

judgments against Mr. Briggs. Since the only issues on appeal involve summary
judgment, this Court addresses only two questions: 1. are there genuine disputes
regarding material facts, and 2. did the District Court correctly apply the law? See
Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979) ("Our inquiry on review is whether
there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is not, whether the plaintiffs
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.") This Court reviews the District Court's
judgment for correctness.
The first summary judgment dismissed Mr. Briggs1 entire complaint (Record on appeal
("R.") at 375; addendum to Brief of Appellant ("Addendum") tab 6). The second granted
Defendants' counterclaim for attorney's fees (R. at 866; Addendum tab 7).

II. DEFENDANTS INCORRECTLY STATE THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Before addressing Defendants' arguments on the substance of this appeal, we must
address their inappropriate standard of review and marshaling arguments. Throughout
their brief, Defendants wrongly claim that the District Court's ruling requires Mr. Briggs
to "marshal the evidence" supporting the District Court's purported factual finding that
Mr. Briggs filed this case in bad faith {see, e.g., Opp'n Br. at 3, 29-30, 38, 39, 40).
Defendants further claim that the District Court's purported factual finding that Mr.
Briggs asserted his claims in bad faith is to be reviewed "under a clearly erroneous

questions for the finder of fact to decide.
5

standard." (Id.)
Summary judgment does not resolve factual disputes; the District Court erred by
making a finding at all. Whether the District Court's finding was right or wrong is
immaterial to this appeal - the issue is whether the District Court could make any finding
of fact on summary judgment. Defendants' burdensome and inaccurate argument focusing
on the correctness of the finding is immaterial and does not assist this Court on appeal.
A. Appellant does not need to marshal the facts in an appeal of summary
judgment
Utah law directly contradicts Defendants' claim that Mr. Briggs must marshal the
evidence in a summary judgment appeal.
When appealing a district court's grant of summary judgment, however, the appellant has
no obligation to marshal the evidence. ... At the summary judgment stage, the district
court is not concerned about the sufficiency of any evidence because it does not resolve
any factual disputes. Therefore, the defendants' marshaling argument was inappropriate.
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, ^|16 n.6, 70 P.3d 904
(citation omitted). Defendants' effort to throw a monkey wrench into Mr. Briggs' appeal
is just as inappropriate as it was for the defendants in Smith.
B. Correctness is appropriate standard of review
• The recent case, In re Discipline of Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, 86 P.3d 712 provides a
lot of guidance for the issues in this appeal. Defendants, however, wrongly rely on it for
their assertion that the proper standard of review is "clearly erroneous" (see, e.g., Opp'n
Br. at 3,ffl[8&9).What Defendants do not tell this Court is that, in Sonnenreich, the trial
6

court dismissed the complaint by summary judgment, but did not grant attorney's fees
until a separate motion was made and heard: "Following this dismissal, Sonnenreich filed
a motion for attorney fees pursuant to section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code." Sonnenreich,
supra, ^[10. This distinguishes Sonnenreich from the current case, where the District
Court awarded attorney's fees in summary judgment, and therefore summary judgment
standards apply.
Summary judgment, as the Utah Supreme Court has said, "presents for review only
conclusions of law because, by definition, cases decided on summary judgment do not
resolve factual disputes. We therefore accord no deference to a trial court's legal
conclusions given to support the grant of summary judgment, but review them for
correctness." Schurtz v. BMW ofNorth America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-1112 (Utah
1991)(citations omitted).
Bad faith, in the context of attorney's fees, is a question of fact to be decided by the
trier of fact: "The issue of bad faith ... is a question of fact to be ascertained by the finder
of fact." Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 534 n.3 (Utah 1993). Even
regarding the award of attorney's fees in summary judgment, the District Court cannot
make findings of fact because summary judgment does not resolve factual disputes.
Therefore, the fact of bad faith must be undisputed: "Although it may be unusual for the
facts concerning attorney fees to be undisputed, the rule is no different where the subject
of the summary judgment is a claim for attorney fees." Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 110
7

P.2d 163, 168 (Utah App. 1989).

III. DEFENDANTS9 "REASONABLE TIME" ARGUMENT CREATES A
QUESTION OF FACT, INVALIDATING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In his Nov. 9, 1999 letter (Briggs Offer), Mr. Briggs tells Defendants that they have
until Nov. 20, 1999 to get back with him and totally resolve this matter. (R. at 184;
Addendum tab 2) Defendants argue that Mr. Briggs was simply seeking a phone call by
Nov. 20, 1999 (Opp'n Br. at 18-19). Mr. Briggs has testified by affidavit that he
demanded performance by Nov. 20, 1999 (R. at 209, ^[15; Addendum tab 4).
On pages 14-15 of their brief, Defendants argue that the District Court can imply a
"reasonableness" term to resolve the time for performance ambiguity in Briggs Offer. In
support of this proposition, Defendants cite Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d
852 (Utah 1998). However, Coulter is fatal to Defendants' argument.
Coulter revolves, as does this appeal, around a grant of summary judgment. The
District Court in Coulter granted summary judgment, ruling that an option contract was
invalid because of the rule against perpetuities, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The
Utah Supreme Court reversed, saying that the time for performance in the contract was
ambiguous and ruled that the "reasonable time" implication might avoid an unenforceable
perpetuity.
The key that Coulter provides to this appeal is what the court says next:
What is a reasonable time under the circumstances and whether that period is less than
8

twenty-one years is & factual determination beyond the scope of our review.... Thus, the
option will be valid under the rule against perpetuities so long as a trier of fact determines
that a reasonable time in this case is less than twenty-one years.
Coulter & Smith, Ltd v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 858-859 (Utah 1998)(emphasis added).
Coulter thus explains that, while the court can imply a reasonable time for performance if
the contract on its face is ambiguous, what that reasonable time would be is a question of
fact and precludes summary judgment (as it did in Coulter).

IV. CONSTRUCTION AGAINST THE DRAFTER RULE UNAVAILABLE IN
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In a footnote, Defendants try to short-circuit the ambiguity issues by saying that the
District Court could construe the ambiguities against Mr. Briggs (Opp'n Br. at 19, n.15).
Defendants' attempt to apply this rule fails on two fronts simultaneously. First, ambiguity
in a contract precludes summary judgment. Second, the "construed against the drafter"
rule is not favored in Utah and courts will apply it only as a last resort.
Utah law holds that ambiguities prevent summary judgment where there is a dispute
about them. "A motion for summary judgment may not be granted if a legal conclusion is
reached that an ambiguity exists in the contract and there is a factual issue as to what the
parties intended." WebBankv. American General Annuity Service Corp., 2002 UT 88,
^J22, 54 P.3d 1139 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Consequently, ambiguities
cannot be resolved in summary judgment.

9

In Utah, the rule providing for construction against the drafter is resorted to only if
extrinsic evidence fails to resolve the parties' intent. In other words, it is a rule of last
resort. "However, in interpreting a contract, we first look to the four corners of the
agreement to determine the intent of the parties. If a contract is ambiguous, it will be
construed against the drafter only if extrinsic evidence fails to clarify the intent of the
parties." Cherry v. Utah State University, 966 P.2d 866, 869-870 (Utah App.
1998)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Note that Cherry allows for
extrinsic evidence and construction rules only after the court has determined the contract
is ambiguous. WebBank, supra, holds that ambiguity renders summary judgment
unavailable.
Furthermore, Defendants have cited no case law for their implied proposition that
such a rule of construction overrides the "all inferences viewed in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party" summary judgment rule when deciding contract ambiguity.
Defendants do cite two cases in their in their attempt to invoke rules of construction
against Mr. Briggs, but neither one is helpful. Defendants first cite Jones, Waldo,
Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996), but that case deals with
a disputed fee agreement between attorney and client, and the courts rightly hold lawyers
to a higher standard of clarity in drafting when dealing with clients, and it does not

2 We note, in passing, that while Defendants want Mr. Briggs' chosen language held
against him, they do not seem as anxious to apply the same rule to Defendants' choice of
"proposal" and "If you are in agreement..." in their response to Mr. Briggs' offer.
10

involve summary judgment. Defendants' second case, Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell
966 P.2d 852 (Utah 1998), applies a principle of interpretation, in the rule against
perpetuities, which prefers to avoid invalidation: "Furthermore, where two different
constructions of an instrument are possible, and only one of them results in an interest
violative of the rule [against perpetuities], the interpretation favoring validity should be
adopted." M a t 858.
Defendants again fail to inform the Court that, as discussed above, Coulter reversed
summary judgment, holding that the ambiguities discussed presented issues for the trier of
fact
Defendants' "conduct of the parties" argument {see e.g., Opp'n Br. at 23-24) raises
similar extrinsic issues, and thus fails for the same reason.

V. QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING WHETHER THE GAZEBO
DESCRIBED IN BROWN RESPONSE IS THE SAME AS THE ONE
DESCRIBED IN BRIGGS OFFER PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On pages 19-23 of their brief, Defendants argue that there is no difference between
the gazebo Mr. Briggs demanded in Briggs Offer and the one Defendants claim to have
ordered in Brown Response. They argue that color, model year, and size differences are
not material. Mr. Briggs has said that the gazebo described by Defendants in Brown
Response is not what he agreed to accept (R. at 489). As the party moving for summary
judgment, Defendants must present undisputed facts proving that there was a meeting of
li

the minds on all material terms and conditions, and they have not done so. "[T]he burden
of proof for showing the parties' mutual assent as to all material terms and conditions is
on the party claiming that there is a contract." Cal Wadsworth Const, v. City of St.
George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1995). These differences, along with the conditional
language used by Defendants in Brown Response asking for Mr. Briggs agreement, make
Brown Response a counter-offer, or at least present genuine, material disputed facts
precluding summary judgment.

VI. MR. BRIGGS9 SUIT WAS MERITORIOUS IN FACT AND LAW
"A claim is without merit if it is of little weight or importance having no basis in law
or fact." Sonnenreich, supra, \ 47 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Appellant's opening brief, at 12-14 states the unrebutted facts: Mr. Briggs paid
Defendants more than $8,900, more than four years before this suit, for a specific model
Cal Spas hot tub and gazebo. Defendants could not deliver when Mr. Briggs demanded
delivery because they no longer carried Cal Spas products. Mr. Briggs demanded a refund
or equivalent merchandise, Defendants refused. Negotiations broke down and Mr. Briggs
sued.
Defendants' response to this suit was to twist a letter sent just before negotiations
broke down into an "unconditional acceptance" of a previous offer to settle by Mr. Briggs
(Briggs Offer, R. at 184; Addendum tab 3). Even though Defendants' Nov. 11, 1999
12

(Brown Response, R. at 185; Addendum tab 4) promises to pay a refund by Nov. 18, 1999
that Defendants did not pay, and even though the gazebo described in Brown Response
was not as demanded in Briggs Offer, and even though Brown Response demands that
Mr. Briggs agree with its terms and identifies itself as a proposal, Defendants insist that
their letter was an "unconditional acceptance" of Mr. Briggs' letter. At the District Court,
this argument prevailed and the court granted summary judgment dismissing Mr. Briggs'
complaint.
This case is rife with material questions of fact: what gazebo Mr. Briggs did demand
(Br. of Appellant at 19 cf Opp'n Br. at 19); whether the gazebo Brown Response
described was that gazebo (Br. of Appellant at 19 cf Opp'n Br. at 20); whether Mr.
Briggs1 demand that Defendants get back with Mr. Briggs and totally resolve this issue by
November 20, 1999 was a demand just to communicate or a demand to complete
performance on his offer by that date (Br. of Appellant at 19 cf Opp'n Br. at 18); whether
the Brown Response amounted to an unconditional acceptance despite its conditions (Br.
of Appellant at 20 cf Opp'n Br. at 16); whether, if there was an unconditional acceptance,
Defendants were in breach by not delivering the refund and gazebo (Br. of Appellant at
33 c/Opp'n Br. at 27-28).
Defendants have also impliedly admitted that Mr. Briggs' suit had merit regarding at
least the more than $8,900 Mr. Briggs paid to Defendants (Opp'n Br. at 26).
These disputes militate against the District Court's first grant of summary judgment
13

and they do not support a conclusion that Mr. Briggs' complaint was frivolous or "of little
weight or importance having no basis in law or fact." Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151
(Utah 1983).
Since lack of merit is a legal conclusion, this Court reviews the District Court's
conclusion for correctness (see, e.g., Sonnenreich, supra), and since this conclusion was
reached in summary judgment proceedings, this Court gives no deference to the trial
court, viewing the undisputed facts and all reasonable inferences drawn from them in the
light most favorable to Mr. Briggs (see, e.g., Alder v. Bayer Corp., AGFA Div., 2002 UT
115).
When the undisputed facts are viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. Briggs, the
conclusion that this suit was without merit is wrong and the District Court's judgment
must be reversed.

VII. CONTRARY TO DEFENDANTS' ASSERTION, THE BAD FAITH
ALLEGATION AGAINST MR. BRIGGS IS STRONGLY DISPUTED.
Defendants assert, repeatedly, that it is undisputed that Mr. Briggs filed this suit in bad
faith (see, e.g., Opp'n Br., at 34, ^jl, Opp'n Br., at 35, ^|5, Opp'n Br., at 5,fflflO-11). "[A]
finding of bad faith turns on a factual determination of a party's subjective intent."
(Sonnenreich, supra, ^[47). To demonstrate bad faith Defendants must prove one or more
of the following is lacking: "(I) [a]n honest belief in the propriety of the activities in

14

question; (2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or
knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will hinder, delay, or defraud others."
{Sonnenreich, supra, f48, quoting Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983) alteration
in original).
Since Defendants have not produced a "smoking gun" {e.g. a competent affidavit that
"Mr. Briggs told me he did not honestly believe in the propriety of this lawsuit.") and Mr.
Briggs has not filed a conclusory and obviously self-serving affidavit {e.g. "I honestly
believe in the propriety of this lawsuit"), Defendants' burden, as movants at summary
judgment is very high; the undisputed facts must foreclose the possibility that a jury could
find for Mr. Briggs on the factual question of bad faith. "We repeat, however, that the
plaintiff, to survive the defendant's motion, need only present evidence from which a jury
might return a verdict in his favor. If he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that
requires a trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
Defendants must show that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to
Mr. Briggs, allow for no other reasonable conclusion than Mr. Briggs' subjective intent
rose to bad faith. ("It is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed material facts in ruling
on a summary judgment. It matters not that the evidence on one side may appear to be
strong or even compelling." Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah
App. 1988)(citation omitted)). Defendants must prove that no sworn statement of Mr.
Briggs disputes the purported finding of bad faith. "One sworn statement under oath is all
15

that is needed to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an
issue of fact, precluding the entry of summary judgment." Id.
In his sworn response to Defendants' interrogatories, Mr. Briggs gives a detailed
account of his dealings with Defendants. For example, he recounts a conversation with
Defendant, Lowell Brown, in which, after telling Mr. Briggs that he would not get what
he had already paid for, Defendant Brown threatens that if Mr. Briggs was going to "put
him in a position that were just gonna butt heads that's fine then we butt heads, you have
to do what you gotta do, I gotta do what I gotta do." (R. at 488; errors in original). Mr.
Briggs goes on to express his opinion that Defendants "had done nothing but try and
cheat me from day one ... and I wasn't going to [accept] his mystery gazebo [i.e. the
gazebo Defendants claim to have ordered] to settle this matter. I figured the only way to
stop him from doing this to me was to take him up on his offer and get an attorney." (R. at
491). Later, "I went to [Plaintiffs counsel, Greg Smith] and had him proceed that day."
Id. Thus, we see Defendants playing "hardball" with Mr. Briggs, even challenging him to
"butt heads" and to get a lawyer. What we do not see in the record is undisputed evidence
that conclusively shows Mr. Briggs' alleged lack of good faith.
In fact, considering that Mr. Briggs had fully paid Defendants for a particular spa and
gazebo four years earlier and Defendants dogged refusal to live up to their end of the
bargain, the entirety of Mr. Briggs' interrogatory responses (R. at 485-496) demonstrates
his great patience in dealing with Defendants.
16

Mr. Briggs only remaining duty under that contract was to enjoy the spa and gazebo
he had paid for four years earlier. Rather than deal with Mr. Briggs honestly and fairly,
and give him what he what he was entitled to, Defendants chose to "butt heads." Mr.
Briggs, unable to persuade Defendants to deal with him fairly, sought his remedy in court,
as Article 1, § 11 of the Utah state Constitution declares he has the right to.

VIII. DEFENDANTS5 BRIEF VIOLATES UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE, 24(J) AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED
The rules are clear about the requirements of briefing to this Court:
Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome,
irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may
be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may
assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer."
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(j).
In what seems to be an effort to bury Mr. Briggs and the Court in an avalanche of
immaterial minutiae, Defendants offer many serial citations to the record that do not serve
to prove that which Defendants must prove, that the undisputed/acte compel summary
judgment. For example, see Opp'n Br., at 35, TJ5 where Defendants proclaim: "Mr. Briggs
made repeated misrepresentations of fact to the trial court." Defendants then cite 48
paragraphs, spanning from page 419 to page 688 in the record that "prove" this point.
However, each of these citations is to memoranda, either in support of Defendants'
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second motion for summary judgment, or to Mr. Briggs' memorandum in opposition.
Defendants' brief does not cite to affidavits, sworn interrogatories, or deposition
testimony.
All of these burdensome citations to previous argument do nothing to prove thereto
Defendants must prove. However, they do make a telling point as to why this litigation
has lasted 4Vi years.
These dizzying citations offer no undisputed material facts demonstrating conclusively
that Mr. Briggs suit was meritless and Mr. Briggs subjectively brought and pursued this
case in bad faith. What they do suggest is the "oft-quoted adage: If the law is against you,
argue the facts; if the facts are against you, argue the law; and if they both are against
you, pound the table and attack your opponent." U.S. v. Griffin, 84 F.3d 912, 927 (7 Cir.
1996).
Furthermore, Defendants misrepresent the facts to this Court. For example, they cite a
case holding that affidavits made on "information and belief are insufficient to provoke
a genuine dispute of fact (Opp'n Br. at 31) when Defendants know that the affidavits,
which they did not object to at the District Court, are made on "personal knowledge and
belief (Id.) regarding matters that Mr. Briggs is competent to testify to, and therefore
sufficient.
In another example, Defendants blend two paragraphs of the Briggs Offer to make it
appear, falsely, that they are part of one thought. By eliminating the blank line between
18

the deadline paragraph and the closing paragraph (with instructions on how to reach Mr.
Briggs) Defendants make it appear that the two separate paragraphs are one (i.e. "you can
contact me" is a continuation of "get back to me and totally resolve") (see Opp'n Br. at
18, bottom block quote). Defendants obscure this omission by including an ellipsis, but
the only thing omitted is the blank line that indicates a new paragraph. That blank line
makes a clear break between the deadline paragraph and the contact information
paragraph. The blank line is necessary to understanding the context. Defendants' tricky
omission violates their duty to present with accuracy.

IX, DEFENDANTS ADMIT THAT MR. BRIGGS RAISED GENUINE DISPUTES
OPPOSING DEFENDANTS9 SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
"One sworn statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute the averments on the
other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding the entry of summary
judgment." Lucky Seven, supra, at 752.
Defendants admit that Mr. Briggs raised genuine disputes to their second motion for
summary judgment (Opp'n Br. at 28, 29). Defendants then argue that these disputes were
not necessary to their claim, so it was acceptable for the District Court to grant summary
judgment in spite of them. However, Defendants are the ones who declared that these
facts were material. Defendants now try to duck the consequences by claiming that the
material facts, which they admit are in dispute, are not material for Utah R. Civ. P. 56
19

purposes ("[TJhose disputes are immaterial within the meaning of Rule 56." Opp'n Br. at
29). While claiming that these disputed facts are not material "within the meaning of Rule
56," Defendants appear to forget that the motion wherein they certified that the facts they
recited were material was a Rule 56 motion.
Defendants then, on page 29 of their brief, quote Kesler v. Kesler, 583 P.2d 87 (Utah
1978). Kesler, is not relevant to Defendants' argument. In Kesler, plaintiff (defendants'
mother) sued for quiet title. Defendants alleged that their late father (plaintiffs husband)
had intended the property be passed to them in a partnership. The court found this
argument to have no legal bearing on the question of title to the property, in effect saying
Defendants allegations were immaterial. "The statements made by defendants in their
depositions and those made by counsel in his proffer of proof do nothing to invalidate
plaintiffs title under joint tenancy." Id. at 88. The court concludes, "|t]here is no issue of
fact as to property ownership and the lower court's decision is hereby affirmed." Id at 89.
The facts of this case are nothing like Kesler. The Kesler defendants did not present a
cognizable defense. Mr. Briggs has a cognizable defense; that he did not bring his suit in
bad faith and that it does have merit, so Kesler is not on point.
Defendants concede that Mr. Briggs did raise a genuine dispute about material facts,
just not the right material facts. Defendants are playing a shell game with Mr. Briggs and
the Court, saying in effect: guess which "undisputed material facts" are really material.
Defendants should not be allowed to succeed in court by tossing around 87 allegations in
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their motion for summary judgment — certifying to the District Court (pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 11) that these allegations are undisputed and material — and then, once the facts
are disputed, declare that those allegations that Mr. Briggs did dispute are not really
material.

X. DEFENDANTS DID NOT RAISE THEIR PURPORTED ALTERNATIVE
BASIS FOR AFFIRMING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DISTRICT COURT
Defendants argue that Mr. Briggs' interrogatories provide an alternate basis for
affirming summary judgment (Opp'n Br. at 11, n5). Defendants correctly point out that
the District Court did not rely on the supposed oral agreement mentioned by Mr. Briggs,
but Defendants fail to say that the reason the court did not rely on it was that Defendants
did not raise it.
While Utah law allows for alternate bases for affirmation, it does not consider such
bases if they were not raised at the District Court: "Summary judgment may be affirmed
on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below." Smith v.
Four Corners Mental Health, 2003 UT 23, y\2 (quotation mark and citation omitted).
"Regarding their first alternative argument, the [Appellees] admit that they did not argue
this question before the district court.... Because we do not consider issues raised for the
first time on appeal, summary judgment cannot rest on this argument." Id. at ^J44
(citations omitted).
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Although some Utah cases prior to Smith allow for alternative bases not raised at the
court below {see, e.g. Bailey v. Bayles 2002 UT 58, ^[10, 52 P.3d 1158), such an approach
is unavailing here, because it leaves as many, or more, factual questions unanswered, e.g.
what did Mr. Briggs offer? Were Defendants in breach? Was this an offer and acceptance
in the legal sense? Also, the argument ignores the words directly following Defendants'
purported acceptance, which say that Defendants were going to draft and send an
agreement for Mr. Briggs' approval (implying that final agreement was still pending), and
the next paragraph, which says that the gazebo described in the letter was not what Mr.
Briggs' had offered to accept (R. at 489).

TABLE OF DISPUTED MATERIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT
In reviewing summary judgment, only two questions are pertinent: (1) are there
disputed material facts? and (2) did the court below correctly apply the law? In this case,
there have always been disputed material facts, and the District Court misapplied the law
on both summary judgments. Defendants' brief to this Court focuses so much on these
facts that the disputes become unmistakably clear.
The following table concisely and conveniently presents some of the key disputes of
fact that warrant reversing the summary judgments entered, and remanding for trial on the
merits.
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Material Question
of Fact
Is Brown Response
an unconditional
acceptance of
Briggs Offer?

Is Brown
Response's
"unconditional
acceptance"
conditioned on Mr.
Brigg's signature
indicating
acceptance?

Defendants' position

! Mr. Briggs'
Status
position
Brown Response
1 Mr. Briggs never
Disputed
unconditionally
agreed to accept the
1999 Cal Spas
accepted Briggs Offer
gazebo (R. at 621;
(R. at 418^5)
also R. at 210419).
-or-andDefendants agreed to
Brown Response did
Mr. Briggs oral offer,
made on November 9, not correspond to the
offer Mr. Briggs had
1999, and then also
made orally (R. at
accepted the Briggs
Offer (Opp'n Br. at 6; 621).
-and1H6-7)
The final three
sentences of Brown
Response, asking for
Mr. Briggs'
agreement and
identifying Brown
Response as a
"proposal" are not
consistent with
unconditional
acceptance. (Brown
Response, R. at
185).
Disputed
Signature requirement Brown Response's
simply acknowledges
words asking for
what is legally implicit acceptance and
in the settlement offer styling itself as a
(Opp'n Br. at 12).
proposal speak for
themselves (R. at
185; Addendum tab
3).
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Is Defendants'
acceptance of
Briggs Offer
demonstrated by
Defendants'
actions?

Is Defendants' nonacceptance proved
! by Defendants'
failure to comply
with their own terms
that directed a
refund to Briggs?
Did Mr. Briggs
demand
performance by
November 20,
1999?

Defendants did order
the gazebo
(presumably, the one
Mr. Briggs had agreed
to accept) (Opp'n Br.
at 14).

Defendants are silent
on the point that their
ostensible
unconditional
acceptance required
them to pay refund by
November 18, 1999.
Mr. Briggs demanded
acceptance by
November 20, 1999
(Opp'n Br, at 13).
-orMr. Brown had
already accepted Mr.
Briggs oral offer prior
to Briggs Offer (Opp'n

Mr. Briggs never
Disputed
agreed to accept a
1999 Cal Spas
gazebo (R. at 621, R.
at 210,1|19),
therefore any gazebo
they might have
ordered was not
demonstration of
acceptance,
-andDefendants have
never tendered the
refund they
promised to pay by
November 18, 1999
(R. at 561, f 2)
Defendants have
Undisputed
never tendered the
refund promised by
November 18, 1999
(R. at 56142)

Refund was
demanded by
November 20, 1999
(R. at 563,lfl5)

Disputed

Mr. Brown called
off any deal (R. at
564,125).

Disputed

Br, at 4, f6).
Did Defendants
repudiate their
ostensible
agreement?

Defendants never
repudiated ostensible
agreement (R. at 518,

112)-
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CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth in Appellant's opening brief and reply brief, Appellant
respectfully requests this Court to reverse the summary judgments and award of attorneys'
fees, and remand this case to the District Court for further proceedings.

DATED this / ' 3

day of

/"^jf

_, 2004.

Gregory B.'
Attorney for Mr. Briggs
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